ISLAMIC CIVILIZATION, AMITY, EQUANIMITY AND TRANQUILITY

ANALYZING AND INVENTING PEACE PARADIGMS, CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PEACEBUILDING STRATEGIES

BY

ABDUL KARIM BANGURA

AND

ALANOUD AL-NOUH
DEDICATION

To Muslims Everywhere!
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Acknowledgments</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Preface</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundational Structure of Peace Paradigms: Peace, Conflict, and Foreign Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 3</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inventing Peace Paradigms: Seen, Lam, Meem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Islamic Tradition and Conflict Resolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 5</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Economic Values, Principles and Strategies for Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 6</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compatibility between Islamic and Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a Means for Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter 7</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bibliography</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>About the Authors</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We, and hopefully many readers, owe gratitude to:

Allah, for all His blessings; without His guidance, nothing would be possible.

Tonetta Landis, an M.A. degree recipient, with a specialization in Comparative and Regional Studies, from the School of International Service at American University in Washington, DC, for her research assistance on the section titled “Approaches and Issues Commonly Employed by Western Scholars in Presenting Islam.”

The numerous families to which we belong, for offering their encouragement and prayers.
This book is not intended to be a critique of democracy nor an antagonistic or provocative study of the potential rise and fall of particular regimes. Rather, it intends to define and describe the theory of democratic peace and to propose Islamic peace paradigms and a conflict resolution strategy that are as compatible, complementary, or as an alternative to the democratic model.

In consideration of the deficit of contending or alternative perspectives regarding the establishment of global peace, Islam is employed to provide the theoretical basis for the probability of a particular regime type as the precursor for peace and stability. By closely scrutinizing the apparent prerequisites of international peace, it defines and describes a peace model using Islam as a historical case study.

The discussion considers the roots of the democratic peace theory, its fallacies, and its language, as well as the question of whether or not democratization can bring stability to the most volatile regions of the world, including the Middle East. The plausible exportability of democracy as a model for peace is also analyzed.

Against a background demonizing Islam, the plan to liberalize the Gulf States and North Africa, which altogether comprise the Middle East, has been vitalized from the days of the Christian Crusades. While efforts to establish a liberal democratic world have gained and lost ground, the popular opinion among historians and intellectuals now proposes that the current instability in the Gulf States region has only one remedy. That remedy postulates the following equation:

Middle East + Democratization = World Stability + World Peace

This book suggests, however, that the democratic peace paradigm is a fallible argument. It probes the following question: On the basis that democracy has neither the historical longevity, nor statistical or empirical validity; how valid is the democratic peace paradigm? While this empirical study questions whether a single ideology is adaptive to world government, it further seeks to answer the following corollary question: If the democratic peace theory is valid, how sustainable and exportable is it?

Certainly, Western globalists favor the hegemonic strategy of a democratic world politic. But, if the argument is sound, why is the theory of democratic peace so strongly debated? The idea of new world order—of one world government—may sound appealing to some, but framed in its present perspective hints of military and political fascism or dictatorship. Yet, the longest standing and most peaceful and stable form of government
in the modern age has not been included in any quantitative or qualitative study. This leads to the final research question: Why is Islam disregarded as a viable component in the equations used to develop a universal peace theory?

While the idea does not imply an Islamic crusade for world dominance, it does imply that Islamic governments can work equitably with democratic states to bring about a more peaceful world notwithstanding the unlikelihood that world peace will develop and prevail without direct intervention from God.

One of the aims of this book is to apply critical discourse aimed at understanding how the development of the democratic peace theory has shaped and legitimized United States foreign policy based on the current foundation credited to 18th Century philosopher Immanuel Kant. While specific policies are not examined, a new level of implied public consent based on an Orwellian vision of national security is identified and explained.

Consequently, some sources of the democratic ideology and its relationship to the state demand empirical examination. Intent and consequences of the nation-state system, officially inaugurated by the French, must be identified in order to expose this aspect of democracy, crippling to the world outside of European culture, and define the relationship between the delineation of borders and the peace paradigm. A strategy for identifying contexts directly related to such affiliations must be analyzed through a historical perspective.

While this book offers a critique of the multivariate explanations for democratic peace, it also examines the contradictions of that theoretical mindset. This is accompanied by a comparative analysis which delves into the most prominent and virulent of those oppositions as well as why the democratic peace theory, in spite of it being proclaimed "the most compelling in modern international politics" by Charles Lipson (2003), is a fecundity of confutation.

The examination of the initial research question is, by association, focused on the challenge of the United States to export democracy throughout a volatile world. But more than that, the comparative case study addresses the conceptualization of democratic peace as an argument of fallacies which fails completely to consider the realities of history and human nature. Here, the case study approach offers the opportunity to analyze a seemingly manufactured ideal having little historical validity, considering its relatively short life span, and little potential for success, an explanation explicit in the analysis on the invention of nation-states, historical evaluation, and the nature of the human being and his/her relationship to political theory and government. This leads to one of the methodological diversions which intervene, questioning the importance and accuracy of theory in international affairs.

Considering, however, Western regard for the democratic peace, the final case study attempts to produce a paradigmatic framework, through historical legitimization, descriptive representation, and practical application, of an alternative, complementary, or a compatible peace theory. In this case, entrenchment of the democratic peace theory,
based on Kant’s *Perpetual Peace*, and the need to find democracy to be a superior form of government are empirically examined.

The concepts developed challenge the democratic peace theory in two ways. The first raises the issue of motivation behind the continuing need to redefine, de-legitimize, and refine the theory in order to provide a basis for the exportation of democracy worldwide, even using force. The second questions the integrity and sincerity of political scientists’ omission of substituting another form of government in the equation where democracy now resides, in order to authenticate the claim that only democracy is capable of producing world peace.

The aim of this comparative approach is to introduce the idea into the political schema that the ways to peace, if they in fact exist in this world, are not limited to a democratic proliferation at the expense of every legitimate form of governance. The difficulty in consolidating the abundance of literature on democratic peace and explanations for conflict led to the uncovering of three multilayered criteria often ignored regarding the proposal that democracies do not fight one another.

The first characteristic, which briefly intervenes in the Islamic case study, is the impact of nuclear deterrence and weapons proliferation and disarmament that is discussed by Layne (1994). For this diversion, little adjustment is made, although the quantitative study does not lend itself to accommodate the implication of the bully on the block attitude of Western hegemony. Secondly, colonization and ethnic diversity, albeit dissimilar concepts, have similar roots, that of race, class, and superiority of values. Most, if not all, of the Western consolidated democracies have not experienced oppressive and consuming occupational colonization and the ensuing confutation of ethnic equality and ambiguity. This factor results in irreparable internal discomposure, underdevelopment, and perpetual civil war.

The condition of disorder is further exemplified by the third characteristic: i.e. the introduction of covert and overt external interference to which the non-Western, non-Anglo populations of the world are continually subjected. Not only does this factor hinder and manipulate political maturity, it also suggests a clandestine sabotage of the very democratic process that the peace paradigm professes to propagate.

In spite of the difficulty in developing a comparative empirical case study methodology, it is hoped that this book explicitly introduces some problems with theoretical approaches and their application in an international context. The omission of juxtaposing alternate peace models de-legitimizes attempts to discover a solution to international conflict. It further recognizes the value of comparative case studies in revealing weakness between theory and application. This is more necessary because of the prevalent way Islam is presented by Western scholars, as shown in the following section.
APPROACHES AND ISSUES COMMONLY EMPLOYED BY WESTERN SCHOLARS IN PRESENTING ISLAM

Today, as one seeks to discover Islam, the faith of more than one billion people globally, he/she is confronted with seemingly never ending popular stereotypes, simplistic scholarship, and questions that not only are not answered but are not even asked. The following simple questions beg to be answered: (a) What is the essence of Islam? (b) What is fundamental to it, both historically and theoretically? (c) Who gets to decide which answers are appropriate for these questions? (d) Who controls the discourse?

In the field of Islamic Studies, these questions are ever present. This section is an attempt to answer them, as much as they can be answered. The aim is to provide an accessible commentary on Islam, both historically and theologically, given special attention to the approaches and issues that are commonly employed by Western scholars in presenting the faith. This section, in short, privileges explanatory power rather than argument and attempts to look at Islam culturally, historically, and theologically. Two most widely used and cited works, published 20 years apart, that exemplify how Islam is presented by Western scholars are explored to these ends: Clifford Geertz’s *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia* (1968) and John Esposito’s *Islam: The Straight Path* (1988).

The relatively short work, *Islam Observed*, was first published in 1968. In this comparative study of Morocco and Indonesia, Clifford Geertz focuses on Islam as a culture. He is intentionally reflexive in his writing and approaches the study of Islam from anthropological and sociological perspectives. At heart, the work is a comparative study of religion, as Geertz makes many references about religion generally that are helpful in considering the changes that have occurred in Islam as part of a larger process of change that has occurred in religions generally. Geertz faithfully situates himself in the narrative by understanding himself and his research as a product of his particular research experience (an approach literary methodologists label as *extradiegetic-homodiegetic*).

John Esposito’s work, *Islam: The Straight Path*, was first published in 1988, 20 years after Geertz’s. Esposito attempts to present a completely objective work that can be used in the classroom as a textbook. It is not comparatively situated but rather attempts to be an historical and theological survey of Islam. Also, in contrast to Geertz, Esposito is never reflexive in his writing and admits no subjectivity in it (an approach literary methodologists label as *extradiegetic-heterodiegetic*).

Geertz writes: “the aim of the systematic study of religion is … to determine just how and in what way particular ideas, acts, and institutions sustain, fail to sustain, or even inhibit religious faith” (1968:2). He defines religious faith as the “steadfast attachment to some transtemporal conception of reality” (Geertz 1968:2). For Geertz, it is the institutions of faith that render it available for analysis. He works from the assumption that there are material reasons for the form faith takes and seeks to examine the interaction between religious and social changes. He argues that the hallmark of modern day religions, including Islam, consists in a shift from the question of “What shall I believe?” to
"How shall I believe it?" Put simply, there has been a shift from religiousness to religious-mindedness, from being held by religious convictions to holding them, from religious symbols as intrinsically coercive to emphasis on these classical symbols as sacred, and from spiritual power to spiritual reputation (Geertz 1968:61). Geertz's overall conclusion is that all religions are moving toward the latter and away from the former. Faith is becoming more and more about symbols that are considered sacred rather than symbols that are considered intrinsically coercive and powerful.

One of the most fascinating aspects of Geertz's framework occurs in his understanding of Freud's concept of secondary revision. In his work on analyzing dreams, Freud realized that while a person was asleep s/he was involved in an experience that was profoundly real to him/her. Once the person awakens and was asked to talk about the dream, however, s/he would distort what s/he remembered of it in an attempt to make it conform to common-sense. In the same way, Geertz points out that "worship and analysis are simply impossible to carry out together, for the one involves being thoroughly involved, caught up, absorbed in one's experience, in what one is living through, while the other involves standing back and, with a certain detachment, looking at it" (1968:108). Secondary revision then, for Geertz, is a fundamental issue that every student of religion must take into account when attempting to understand that religion.

Geertz begins his comparison of Morocco and Indonesia by giving brief histories of the two countries. The Umayyads, the first Islamic dynasty, invaded the area of modern day Morocco in the late 7th Century. By the middle of the 8th Century, the Umayyads had solidified their grip on the area. Culturally, Morocco was without a mature peasant culture but rather was shaped by tribes from the peripheral deserts and mountains raiding the more urban areas. The towns were creations of the tribe, as the periphery created the center. Geertz calls the basic style of life in Morocco "strenuous, fluid, violent, devout, and unsentimental, but above all, self-assertive" (1968:8).

In contrast, Indonesia was a peasant society involved heavily in the cultivation of rice. The style of life in the area was settled and industrious. The Islamic faith came by trade rather than by conquest to Indonesia and arrived in a developed Hindu-Javanese state rather than into an essentially virgin area, according to Geertz. He argues that "in Indonesia Islam did not construct a civilization, it appropriated one" (Geertz 1968:11). Islam in Indonesia could, thus, be describes as malleable, tentative, syncretistic and multivoiced prior to the advent of structuralism while Islam in Morocco came to be defined by individual force of character and spiritual representation which combined in the marabout.

Geertz next compares Islam in the two countries through the lives of two figures that have obtained mythological stature. To begin, Raden Djaka Sahid was born into the family of an Indonesian official. He became a thief, even stealing from his own mother; and when her money ran out, he became a widely feared highwayman. One day, Sunan Bonang, a Muslim, came to the town where Sahid was staying. Bonang was dressed in expensive clothes and jewelry, and Sahid stopped him and brandished a dagger. Bonang scolded the
young man for continually wanting things and called his attention to a tree of money. Sahid looked and there stood the tree of money. He was astounded that anyone with access to such things did not seek them. Sahid then told Bonang that he wished to change his ways and be instructed by the older man. Bonang responded by telling him to wait there by the river for his return. Sahid waited there for 20, 30, or even 40 years. The world moved on around him, but there he remained lost in meditation. Finally, Bonang returned and told Sahid that he was now the teacher and knew more even than himself. Bonang asked complex questions and Sahid answered them all correctly. Bonang then instructed him to go and spread Islam and gave him the name of Kalidjaga. Geertz writes: “He had become a Muslim without ever having seen the Koran, entered a mosque, or heard a prayer—through an inner change of heart that was the core religious act of the Indic tradition” (1968:29). Kalidjaga stands, then, as the example of Indonesian Islamic experience.

Sidi Lahsen Lyusi serves as the example of Moroccan Islamic experience. He spent his entire life wandering, as opposed to Kalidjaga’s immobility. Eventually, his wanderings took him to the Nasiri Sufi order in the oasis of Tamgrut. The leader of the order, Sheikh Ahmed ben Nasiri, was sick with a horrible disease when Lyusi arrived. The Sheikh asked each of his disciples to wash his nightshirt and each declined out of fear. Without being asked, Lyusi took the nightshirt to a nearby spring, rinsed it, and wringing it out, drank the filthy water that flowed from it. Lyusi’s eyes were immediately changed, but he did not get sick. All of the members of the order recognized that Lyusi had received the Sheikh’s baraka, or supernatural power. The transformation consisted of, in Geertz’s words, “extraordinary physical courage, absolute personal loyalty, ecstatic moral intensity, and the almost physical transmission of sanctity from one man to another” (1968:33).

Geertz’s work continues by discussing what he terms the “religious styles” of each country. Indonesia’s religious style is that of illumination while that of Morocco is maraboutism. The illuminationist worldview is elitist, esoteric, and aesthetic. It rests on three ideas that Geertz terms (1) the Doctrine of the Exemplary Center, (2) the Doctrine of Graded Spirituality, and (3) the Theatre State. The first doctrine defines the court as a metaphor of the Divine and of the social order. Graded Spirituality carries the notion that spirituality is determined by social rank and is unequally distributed in the world. Those who are highest in social status will have greater access to the Divine. The concept of the Theatre State is best summed up in Geertz’s statement that “spectacle was what the state was for” (1968:38). Its role was not primarily one of governance but rather was one of showcasing the themes for which the state stood. Hegemony was manifested through the scale of ceremony.

Central to the Moroccan religious style was the marabout. He was a man who was assumed to be bound, as in physically fastened, to God. He was the possessor of baraka, a term often defined as Divine favor and magical power. In Indonesia, the Divine reached into the world through the exemplary center. In Morocco, it came through an endowment
given to an individual. The central theological question then was the following: “Who was baraka?”

Islam Observed ends the comparison of the two countries by discussing the lives of two real 20th Century leaders: Sukarno and Muhammad V. Sukarno, the first president of independent Indonesia, relied on progressing toward what he himself termed a mythos. He espoused three ideologies during his presidency, two of which are instructive to us. In 1945, Sukarno set forward the following Five Points as the content of his new creed that he believed should guide the nation after its formation: (1) nationalism, (2) humanitarianism, (3) democracy, (4) social justice, and (5) belief in God. The Five Points represented a blended ideology, and Sukarno “saw himself as the exemplar of this sort of eclectic integration” (Geertz 1968:85). Sukarno later espoused what he called “Guided Democracy.” Through this form of democracy, Sukarno created a theater state. Examples of exemplary politics during this period include the building of the world’s largest mosque and a national monument that was taller than the Eiffel Tower.

Muhammad V came to embody the maraboutic king. In 1953, Muhammad V, the puppet king of Morocco under French rule, decided to stop singing the prefabricated decrees given to him by the French. He was removed from the throne and exiled as a result. He became a national hero overnight; and when he returned two years later to rule independent Morocco, he combined within himself both strong man and holy man characteristics.

In his introduction to Islam: The Straight Path, John Esposito states his goal clearly as follows: “This volume seeks to explain the faith, the belief, and the doctrine of Islam. It provides a guide to understanding how Islam has developed, spread, and informed the faith and lives of millions of Muslims throughout the ages” (1988: introduction). His work weaves in and out of history and theology to describe and explain Islam. Unlike Geertz, Esposito does very little in the way of considering Islam as a culture.

Prior to the emergence of Islam, the area that was to become its home, the Arabian Peninsula, was situated between the Byzantine and Sasanid Empires. Judaism, Christianity, Zoroastrianism and many other religions were practiced there. On the local level, however, individual behavior was driven more by what Esposito terms “tribal humanism” than by religious concern. Tribal humanism emphasized honor and manliness as virtues and had a this-worldly view of justice, since the concept of human accountability beyond this life was absent in the worldview. Mecca was an emerging center of commerce due to its location on important trade routes. The transformation in Meccan society that resulted from its evolving commercial status caused upheaval, both socially and psychologically. No one, however, predicted the movement that was soon to emerge in the area.

In 570 CE, Muhammad Ibn Abdullah (PBUH) was born. He was orphaned at a young age, and as a young man became involved in Mecca’s thriving caravan trade. He eventually became the business manager of a wealthy widow named Kadija, and she also became
his wife. He was considered a deeply reflective man and was often known by the name of El-Amin, which means “the trusted one.” In 610, while meditating outside the city, a supernatural intermediary that later identified himself as Archangel Gabriel commended Muhammad (PBUH) to recite. In fear, Muhammad (PBUH), who was illiterate, replied that he had nothing to recite, and twice more the command was given. After the third command, the words came to Muhammad (PBUH) that became the first revelation. Muhammad (PBUH) continued to receive revelations of this nature for the next 22 years; the initial Divine breakthrough is celebrated by Muslims all over the world as the “Night of Power and Excellence” during the month of Ramadan, or fasting.

After this first revelation, Muhammad (PBUH) resolved to kill himself believing that he was possessed by an evil spirit. Archangel Gabriel prevented Muhammad’s (PBUH) suicide; and when Muhammad (PBUH) returned to Mecca and told his wife of the event, she assured him that he was not insane. It is also noted that his wife’s Christian cousin, Waraqa Ibn Qusayy, rejoiced over the revelation and immediately recognized Muhammad (PBUH) as a Prophet.

Muhammad (PBUH) began to preach in Mecca, but almost wholly the people there and particularly the leadership of the city rejected his teachings. From 610 until 620, Muhammad (PBUH) continued to preach in Mecca and was continually rebuffed. This cycle ended when Muhammad’s (PUBH) wife died in 619, and he was subsequently invited to Yathrib the following year to arbitrate a dispute between warring Arab tribes there. In 622, due to attempts on his life, Muhammad (PBUH) and his 200 or so followers escaped for Yathrib, which later was named Medina. This journey is known in Islamic history as the hijra and marks the beginning of the Islamic calendar.

In Mecca, Muhammad (PBUH) had more success in his preaching and became the recognized Prophet and ruler of a religio-political community. Still, although Muhammad’s (PBUH) influence had grown, the Meccan people, especially the Meccan elite, continued to rebuff the new community. Mecca, however, was central to the faith. Muslims prayed in the direction of Mecca, and the city was to be the destination of the annual hajj, or pilgrimage. In addition, Mecca was the religious, political, economic and intellectual center of the country and was crucial for increasing the influence of the religion.

In 624, the Muslims began military raids against Mecca; and after four years, a truce was struck between the Muslims of Yathrib/Medina and the people of Mecca which allowed for the pilgrimage to take place each year. In 630, the Muslims did make the pilgrimage to Mecca, but Muhammad (PBUH) soon accused the ruling Meccan tribe of breaking the truce. Muhammad (PBUH) and about 10,000 of his followers entered the city to perform the first pilgrimage after a negotiated settlement, even though they had the upper-hand after defeating the Meccan forces a year earlier. The Meccans converted to Islam, and Muhammad (PBUH) offered the city a general amnesty. Muslim control was extended over most of the Arabian Peninsula in the next two years by both military and diplomatic means. In 632, Muhammad (PBUH) died.
In order to properly understand the history of Islam after Muhammad’s (PBUH) death, it is essential to understand that this history was always linked to the existence of a Muslim empire or state. By 640, Islamic armies had caused the collapse of both the Byzantine and the Sasanid Empires. During that time, they also conquered Iraq, Syria, Palestine, Persia, and Egypt. The success of these campaigns leads one to wonder about their methods. Simply put, the Muslim invaders prioritized the spread of their rule above conversion to the faith. A conquered population was allowed to choose between conversion, protected status that involved payment of a tax without conversion, or battle. The Muslims were also effective governors in that they only replaced indigenous rulers’ armies while leaving the local bureaucracies and cultures largely intact.

The next period of Islamic history is known as the caliphate period. It lasted from 632 until 1258 and is usually divided into three periods: (1) the “Rightly Guided Caliphs,” 623–661; (2) the Umayyad Empire, 661–750; and (3) the Abbasid Empire, 750–1258. The first period is considered the normative empire for Sunni Islam. The Umayyad period was one of intense expansion, as the empire spread across North Africa into Spain and Portugal, and reached the borders of the Indian subcontinent. A resistance movement to the Umayyads produced the Abbasid Empire. The Abbasids are remembered for their economic prosperity and their placement of Islam as the cornerstone of their power rather than Arab identity. Great urban centers flourished during this period, Islamic philosophy emerged, and Islamic jurisprudence was formulated.

A major dividing event in Muslim history also occurred during the caliphate period. The caliph was the leader of the Muslim community that exercised direct control of political, military, judicial and fiscal administration. The fourth caliph, Ali Ibn Abi Talib, was the cousin and son-in-law of Muhammad (PBUH), and some in the community believed that Muhammad (PBUH) had designated him as his successor. To these followers of Ali, known as Alids, the first three caliphs that had been chosen by consensus were usurpers. The Alids are ancestors of the Shiite (partisans of Ali who took their name from the Arabic Shiah, meaning followers) of today.

After becoming caliph, Ali appointed a replacement to the then ruling governor of Syria, Muawiyah. The latter, however, refused to give up his power and, in 657, Ali led his army against the rebel. As the battle progressed, it became clear that Muawiyah’s forces would be defeated; but before that happened, they called for arbitration. The arbitration proved inconclusive, and Muawiyah continued to govern Syria. In 661, Ali was murdered by a group, the Kharijites, who labeled him apostate because he continued to allow Muawiyah to rule. Upon Ali’s assassination, Muawiyah laid claim to the caliphate, ushered in the Umayyad dynasty, and moved the capital to Damascus. Just under 20 years later, Muawiyah’s son, Yazid, came to power. A son of Ali, Husayn, was persuaded by Alids to lead a rebellion against Yazid that resulted in the slaughter of Husayn and his small force at Karbala. This is the paradigmic event in Shii history and constitutes a sort of passion.
In the latter part of the 10th Century, a Shii dynasty from Persia, the Buyids, invaded the Abbasid capital at Baghdad. They left the caliph on the throne but stripped all real power from him. This began a sultanate period that saw the decentralization of Islamic power. The Seljuqs later conquered the Buyid sultanate. In 1258, the final blow to the centralized caliphate fell when the Mongol commander, Hulagu Khan, invaded and sacked Baghdad, killing the ruling family and virtually all inhabitants of the city. Power greatly fragmented in the Islamic world until the rise of its three most powerful sultanates: (1) the Ottoman, (2) the Moghul, and (3) the Safavid Empires. At their heights, these three empires boasted great prosperity and declared a sort of trans-cultural Islamic community. These three empires declined with the rise of Western power in the world. Indeed, as a result of the emergence of Western power in the 18th Century, the Muslim world would be forever changed and, in particular, the content of its faith.

Throughout his prophetic ministry, Muhammad (PBUH) maintained that he was calling people back to the original faith and was not bringing a new message. He emphasized an uncompromising monotheism that placed at the center of its understanding of God the concepts of *tawhid* and *shirk*. *Tawhid* is the idea of the absolute unity of God. *Shirk* is the gravest sin for a Muslim. *Shirk* is associating anything with God or assuming any type of polytheism. Muhammad’s (PBUH) preaching called people back to the straight path of God’s law, which was prescribed in the revelations Muhammad (PBUH) received. These revelations were later collected and written down and became the *Qur’an* of today. The *Qur’an* is the literal, uncreated, and eternal word of God. No input of Muhammad (PBUH) is contained within it, and it is based on a preexisting tablet in Heaven that is written in Arabic. The *Qur’an* was sent down as the final in a series of revelations from God and out of his mercy. The previous revelations of the Torah and the Evangel had been corrupted after the deaths of the Prophets (PBUH) to whom the words came. Thus, Muhammad’s (PBUH) revelations were God’s attempts to give his law to people one final time. In the *Qur’an*, God does not reveal Himself but rather His will. The *Qur’an* does, however, present God as completely transcendent, merciful, and just.

As a discipline, theology emerged in the Abbasid period as a reaction to contemporary ideas circulating in the region. Two major theological issues were to shape the faith. The first issue was about grave sin and its effect upon membership in the Muslim community. The second issue followed from the first and considered determinism versus free will. On the first issue, the Kahijites took the stance that a Muslim had to be religiously observant to remain a Muslim. The Murjites countered that a judgment could not be made on the subject, as God was the only one who could decide. The attitude of the Murjites came to dominate Sunni Islam and faith, rather than specific acts, and was taken to determine membership in the community. On the second issue, determinism versus free will, the majority of Muslims believed that God’s power could never be limited to human action and, thus, tended to see the universe as determined by God rather than overarchingly
affected by the actions of men. Abu al-Hasan Ali al-Shari was instrumental in bringing about a synthesis between the two perspectives.

**ISSUES IN PRESENTING ISLAM**

After looking at the approaches and presentations of Clifford Geertz and John Esposito, some brief lessons can be drawn from the issues involved in presenting Islam. The ideas of Chandra Talpade Mohanty (1991) are used broadly to guide the following discussion.

If Islam is to be discovered as both a faith and a culture, then it must first be presented. But what does this presenting entail? Mohanty argues that Muslims must first be made a single category with disregard for their differences and individuality. In order to present Islam, reduction must take place. The creation of the category of “Muslims” also creates “the other.” Often, when Islam is presented in texts, “the other” becomes whoever the author is not. If the author is a Muslim, his/her identity becomes bound up with the category s/he is describing. If the author is not a Muslim, then s/he often situates the category as the other. In our case, both authors are non-Muslims from the Western world. Another important question Mohanty raises deal with whether or not creating an image of Islam sustains Western hegemony. Does the presentation of Islam colonize the history of the Muslim world? With regard to these two questions is the issue of self-preservation versus re-presentation as well.

Both Geertz and Esposito consciously attempt to present the variations in Islam. Geertz does so by using a comparative framework, and Esposito’s treatment of various groups within Islam such as the Kharijites serves the same end. Biases, however, are evident in both works. Geertz, writing in the 1960s, seems clearly a product of his time. For example, he refers at one point to Islam as “Muhammadism.” This would not have been uncommon at the time the book was written, but it does bring into question the depth at which he understands Islamic theology. It also seems evident that Geertz’s work very much had Christianity as the implied referent. Another bias of *Islam Observed* comes when Geertz refers to concepts such as “high culture.” He does not bother to define what he means by such terms but rather assumes that the reader will take them for granted. Esposito’s biases come in his assumptions that he is rightly interpreting the *Qur’an*. Two statements are particularly problematic. First, in his discussion of the concept of *jihad*, he says that it is not supposed to include aggressive warfare. He does not, however, say that this is his interpretation and that many Muslim *Qur’anic* scholars do believe that *jihad* is linked, at least in certain cases, to aggression. Second, Esposito declares that the *Qur’an* does not stipulate veiling. Again, however, this is an area of debate in the Muslim world, but Esposito never notes that. He declares his own judgments, in these cases, as objective truths.

Mohanty ends her essay with a quote by Karl Marx that seems instructive: “They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented” (Mohanty 1991:80). This seems to
be the dominant idea in much of the scholarship on Islam. Thus, with renewed scholarly interest in Islam in contemporary times, it is necessary to pay greater attention to the way it is presented. Perhaps, indeed, it is crucial even to move beyond the assumption that works such as those of Geertz and Esposito are presentations at all and to see them instead as re-presentations.
CHAPTER 1

Introduction

It is almost universally thought that when we call a country democratic we are praising it ... Words of this kind are often used in a consciously dishonest way (Orwell 1996:591).

In his essay entitled “Politics and the English Language,” George Orwell, famous for his novels, Animal Farm and 1984, states that “Political language is designed to make lies sound truthful” (1996:600). Expressing his concern for the political abuse of language, he mentions democracy, for which no consensus of definition is to be found, as a target of strategic usage (1996:591). Orwell suggests that those who latch on to the ambiguity of the word democracy do so fearing that their resistance to concreteness will be exposed as the ideological propagation and linguistic imperialism that it is (1996:595).

Orwell’s comments are not intended to be derogatory toward democracy. Likewise, Hannah Arendt predicts that the ideology will likely last as indefinitely as any other form of government, but he is critical of the inaccuracy with which it is used to encompass “almost every kind of regime” (Arendt 1996:590, Orwell 1996:595). In some cases, acceptance is solely dependent upon circumstances favorable to United States’ interests. For this reason, Orwell’s essay cautions against debasing language to further political ends.

In a book titled Understanding Power, Noam Chomsky gives an interesting example of language abuse for particular political ends. In the section subtitled “Orwell’s World and Ours,” he comments on the idea that the United States is supporting democracy around the world, asking “What does it all mean?” (2002:42). Considering the wide-ranging and ambiguous descriptions stretched to accommodate the state of Israel, what does it mean when the press constantly reminds the public that “Israel is the sole democracy in the Middle East?” (Zakheim 2005). Popular elections have been held, albeit in some cases inconsistently, in Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Egypt, Palestine, and Iran, and most, if not all, are constitutional governments.
Citing the examples of Central America, Chomsky notes that El Salvador and Guatemala are always referred to as democracies, but Nicaragua is not. Although all three nations have elections, and an independent press, and in Nicaragua, political opposition is freer to call for the overthrow of the government than in both El Salvador and Guatemala, Nicaragua is not recognized as a democratic state. Chomsky explains the reason for this disparity by commenting about Guatemala and El Salvador that “the right people are running them; if the right people aren’t running them, then they’re not democracies” (2002:42–43). Likewise, he adds that in the United States, to refer to a state as “moderate” means it “follows U.S. orders” as opposed to “radical,” which means it “doesn’t follow U.S. orders” (2002:43). Chomsky goes one step further to portray how the framing of language can determine political ends, by suggesting that open opposition to democratization insinuates that an individual, leader or country is working against the popular political flow—the third wave of democracy—and that the individual, leaders or country is working in opposition to the process of peace (2002:43).

Along with the debasing of language itself, this framing concept is utilized to indoctrinate people, or to produce propaganda, as a valuable tool for persuading and inventing the public’s understanding of events, especially historical and political ones. Aside from the well-known and extensive use of propaganda during the Cold War, to maintain public fear of communist invasion, lesser recognized uses of historical propaganda are imminently useful in recounting the “Manifest Destiny” of the late 15th Century European discovery and occupation of the Americas.

Jacques Ellul, remarks about it, in his book, Propaganda, that democracy cannot exist without the characteristics of propaganda to further its aims (1965:232). Its inevitability rests upon the fact that democracy depends on public opinion and consent, making the need to properly frame and package propaganda inseparable from ideology (Ellul 1965:232). Ellul further suggests that while propaganda is inimical to democratic regimes, the eventual triumph of truth resolves the discrepancies it creates (1965:233). The reason, says Ellul, is the reality of history (1965:234).

Unfortunately, experience has not necessarily proven Ellul to be correct, particularly regarding the obvious discrepancies that exist in the manner in which the conquest and decimation of First/Native Americans, erroneously called “Indians,” has been systematically taught and reinforced throughout the entire existence of the United States. In The Chomsky Reader, Noam Chomsky relates John Quincy Adams’ Fourth of July speech in which he iterates that “The first settlers … immediately after landing, purchased from the Indian natives the right of settlement upon the soil” (Chomsky 1987:122). By establishing this social “pact,” a civil society was formed (Chomsky 1987:122–123).

Countless American educated school children have been indoctrinated with such faulty information, while their teachers surely recognized the fallacy of the idea that the First/Native Americans established a friendly, voluntary, and equitable social contract with the
Europeans. Had such an agreement been truthful, the story might have ended there. The following years, however, were rife with elaborate tales of “scalping” and “Indian raids” on circled covered wagons; White settlers braving the harsh and dangerous life of the savage lands, wanting only to peacefully establish these United States of America. In fact, the social pact was one-sided, as First/Native Americans fed and protected the English through their first winter. Having learned how to plant and grow food, the following years witnessed the total “burning of their benefactors’ villages and fields, leaving the Indians destitute for the following winters” (Morgan 1975:25–43).

While the following case studies will expose tactics used to market and advance democracy around the globe, it is not the primary objective of this book. In the course of analyzing and inventing peace paradigms, however, some fallacies of the argument are exposed. Concerning the frequently debated theory that a world of nation-states based entirely on democracy will result in global peace, both formal and informal fallacies have been widely employed, juxtaposed with the invention and abuse of political language, and framed in such a way as to distort historical perspective.

To be clear about what can be expected to be exposed within the case studies, a brief description of fallacies is necessary. Informal fallacies can generally be described as errors in reasoning that are dependent on word use and sentence structure involved in an argument (Lunsford 2001:63–72). Formal fallacies result from illogical, invalid deductive arguments whose consequence validates an already invalid antecedent, or whatever statement or position is inferred by the proposed condition.

Fallacies are biases used to persuade the reader or listener to view events in a particular way and are closely related to another political tactic called framing. “Conservatives have spent decades defining their ideas, carefully choosing the language with which to present them, and building an infrastructure to communicate them,” says George Lakoff, Linguistics Professor at the University of California, Berkley (2003:1). They have numerous descriptions, including ethical, logical, and emotional ones, each with a wide variety of specialized appeals (Lunsford 2001:74). Three specific logical fallacies constitute the basic representation of democratic theory. The logical fallacy called begging the question is the most prominent technique. This faulty argument begins with the assumption that the audience accepts the idea that democracy is the only valid and worthy political system for humankind. Begging the question might be composed in a statement such as “Only in the Middle East and North Africa has democracy failed to expand in the past three decades” (Brumberg, Diamond and Plattner 2003:ix). Several conclusions are entailed in the premise:

a. The Middle East and North Africa failed to expand democratically.
b. Democracy is the standard measurement for political systems.
c. The Middle East and North Africa do not meet standards.
Brumberg, Diamond and Plattner (2003) assume that the audience agrees and accepts democracy as the standard measurement for success or failure of political systems. Not only have these regions not expanded within three decades, apparently enough time to show expansion, but they are failures because they lack democratic expansion.

The second composition fallacy is labeled *non sequitur*. This type of argument attempts to tie together logically unrelated ideas (Lunsford 2001:74). In a recent article in the *Wall Street Journal*, Francis Fukuyama committed a number of logic errors in the following statement about Indonesia (2005:A12):

> It is unquestionably Asian and Muslim, and yet has evolved into a credible democracy in the different years since the crisis that brought Suharto down in 1998. Indonesia shows, in fact, that even for an Asian Muslim society democracy is the only durable source of legitimacy.

Not only does this argument beg a question or two and present false analogies, but in a *non sequitur* fallacy Fukuyama implies that *Suharto* fell from power; therefore, Indonesia evolved into a credible democracy, although he does not present a shred of evidence to validate this claim. Due to this event, which supposedly evolved over a short period of six or seven years, it is proven that democracy is the only durable source of legitimacy. Again, Fukuyama does not provide evidence or criteria as to what constitutes durability or legitimacy.

Third, the continued implication that the rest of the world is becoming democratic, therefore so should the Middle East, is expressed by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice as an example of an emotional fallacy referred to as the Bandwagon Appeal. Rice challenged Syria in a speech to Egyptian President Hosnie Mubarak “to make the strategic choice to join the progress all around” (Kessler 2005:A1, A17). Having prepared the reader to note such fallacies within the case studies to be presented, the review of existing perspectives will reveal the deficit of information available, that proposes alternatives, not to the way democracies make peace, but to the idea that the validity of the peace theories cannot remain unchallenged by the potential for peace among other political systems, particularly Islam.

**REVIEW OF EXISTING PERSPECTIVES**

The following review examines a substantial sample of the literature on the topic of democratic peace. What follows is an attempt to review and analyze the themes embedded in the works.

“The embodiment of the most fully-grown modern nation-state is the constitutional state; a self conscious, adult, self-regulated democratic state” (Oren 1995:170), so read the lecture notes of Woodrow Wilson from his class on Public Law at Johns Hopkins
University near the end of the 19th Century. It is a definition which subordinates the state of democracy to the constitutional state; the constitutional state being superior to other state types.

Wilson indicated four elements which comprise the character of constitutional states. They include (1) representation of the people, (2) administrative processes subject to the rule of law, (3) a tenured judiciary, and (4) formalized rights for individual liberty (Oren 1995:171, Link 1968:400). Taking into consideration that constitutions are designed for a particular location and time, none being superior to another, Wilson lauded the constitutional administrations of Germany, France, Switzerland, and the United States, in which the constitution reigns supreme (Oren 1995:171). There are, however, few among constitutional states which have realized the democratic nature of the modern state. Wilson included only the United States, Switzerland, and to a lesser degree England, adding to that Australia, among those with a reasonable degree of liberty, recognizing as he did that “democracy is only possible when the nation is ripe for it” (Oren 1995:172).

Not included within the broad description of constitutional and democratic is what has today been represented as the essence of democracy—elections. Like the Athenians, the French, the British, and the Germans before him, Wilson believed a democracy could only be properly run by those trained and educated men heir to privilege, as long as their opportunity to rule was equal. More precisely, Woodrow Wilson suggested that universal suffrage would lead to the collapse of the democratic state, allowing a means by which a revolution or a coup d’état might overcome liberty (Oren 1995:173).

Among the pioneers of the study of Political Science, Wilson lauded the Prussian-German administration as being the closest to perfection. He warned American administrators, however, against blindly imitating what the United States must do on its own, with its own unique peculiarities, nurtured by an educational system, in order to create the class of citizens responsible for the process and exercise of self-government (Oren 1995:77).

Today, historians and biographers have distinguished Woodrow Wilson's oratorical style as metaphorical and artistic, as opposed to literal, and idealistic and emotional, as opposed to technical, focused on his own fantasy of a constitutional government rather than the more technically detailed (Ross 1982:662). Wilson's description of the democratic state is inconsistent with the present definitions strewn among the plethora of opinions regarding the relationship of state, or regime-type to the democratic state, or more particularly, for this book, the establishment of a democratic peace in an international world.

Inconsistency was no error on Wilson's part, however, and there is little disagreement on the strength, importance, and precision of Wilson's oratory (Ross 1982:662). Likewise, there is little confusion on the Wilsonian thesis that elucidated Thomas Jefferson's “empire of liberty” and the American national motivation of “Manifest Destiny” when Wilson iterated the role of the United States upon entering World War I. That role was described as being “for democracy … for the rights and liberties of small nations … and to make the world itself free” (Spanier and Hook 1998:321).
Lippmann describes the reluctance with which President Wilson succumbed to the prospect of a conflict driven European reunion on the battlefields of Europe, predicated on his own Anglophobic philosophy:

Since the world was no longer safe for the American democracy, the American people were called upon to crusade to make the world safe for the American democracy. In order to do this the principles of American democracy would have to be made universal throughout the world. In this world there will be no wars except universal wars against criminal governments who rebel against the universal order. Therefore … all wars are crusades which can be concluded only when all people have submitted to the only true political religion. There will be peace only when all the peoples hold and observe the same self-evident principles (Lippmann 1952).

To encourage his philosophical prediction, Wilson established the League of Nations as a global institution that would prevent all wars, which was founded in 1919, ironically, without the cooperation and membership of the United States. The League evolved into the United Nations after World War II, inheriting some aspects of the former organization, including its mission. Wilsonian ideology also favored intervention policies such as the Truman Doctrine, The Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO), the intervention in Korea, and the Mutual Securities Act (Lippmann 1952). Additionally, President Wilson's smooth and highly emotional public appeals rallied the American people and inspired hope that the end of the extensive “crusade” would bring peace and universal order. Since the American Revolution, no other President had so changed the pace and face of American foreign policy and international relations.

In spite of the clear indication that the Wilsonian post–World War I foreign policy of the United States equated to a simple Orwellian equation such as war = peace, the idea that democratic states do not fight one another has evolved into a national debate. The concept has been framed within the multivariate literature pertaining to the concept of a global democratic peace that converges and diverges on several variables for which an overwhelming amount of literature exists. While the framing of the content is similar, there are, however, rarely two points of view which agree and can pinpoint the converging variables identically.

Wilson's utopianism obviously embodied an ideal which proposed that world peace depends on the perpetuation of democratic institutions; he represented American exceptionalism and in many ways was the originator of a school of intellectual thought that has influenced American foreign policy even to this day (Kissinger 1994:44, Ray 1998:28). It is, however, realism and neo-realism, “the language of power and interests,” and the systematized deductive theory produced by it that, according to Ray, predominated North American intellectual discussion (Ray 1998:29, Keohane 1986:9). In other words,
mentions Keohane, theoretical interpretations should have implications for practice and should be used by those who influence events (Keohane 1986:2).

First proposed by Thucydides, and perpetuated by Kenneth Waltz, the idea of democratic peace, supported by “neoliberal theoretical notions,” should not only explain the democratic peace paradigm, but should also account for how the constantly changing global configuration will affect its continuance (Ray 1998:29, Keohane 1986:15). In the greater number of studies, the subject is approached through empirical research for which the following has been concluded: Not only do democracies never fight one another, but democratic dyads are not likely to even have serious disputes that might lead to war. According to Benjamin F. Trueblood, following his tenure as Secretary of the American Peace Society, the peace idea “entered deeply into modern literature” due to “modern methods of intercommunication that have put all parts of the complex modern world into incessant touch with each other” (1932:27–28). The art of peace is a Christian ideal, suggests Trueblood, first introduced by Jesus. For that reason, claims Trueblood, did Grotius first plea to King Henry IV “to lessen the cruelties and suffering inflicted by war” (Trueblood 1932:17). Otherwise, unchristian like behavior, declared Grotius, would be perceived as “a disgrace even to barbarians” (Trueblood 1932:17).

It was reflected in modern phenomena, at the opening of the 20th Century, as international arbitration, arising out of the growth of political liberty (Trueblood 1932:95). The new liberal worldview, with its emphasis on individual freedom, tended to reverse the pessimistic view of Hobbesian and Rousseauian thinking, arguing instead that international cooperation, based on “free-market” economics, will evolve into a borderless and Unitarian world (Goldstein 2001:9–10, 110). Focusing on the inherent value of stable democratic institutions, norms, and shared values, checks and balances, and economic interdependence, political scientists, sociologists, and economists have since gathered on various sides of the debate to argue that democratic peace is the doorway to the future state of the new global order.

Formulated on ideas put forth by Immanuel Kant that peaceful relations between democracies are based on common principles, cooperation, and mutual respect and hospitality, the theory has been adjusted over time to accommodate opinions from Adam Smith and J. S. Mill to Woodrow Wilson and Bill Clinton. Jack Levy describes the idea as the closest thing to an empirical law as can be concluded (Layne 1994). He contends, along with Zeev Maoz (1997) and Nasrin Abdolali (1989), that democracies never fight one another. Among those who suggest that democracies rarely fight one another, Michael Doyle (1986) is one of the most articulate. Doyle’s argument, which leans heavily on the normative perspective, finds that institutions and a “spirit of commerce” are the bases of democratic cooperation; and that since 1816 no two liberal nations have fought wars with each other on these grounds (Doyle 1986:1161, Spiro 1994:50, Diamond 1992).

The notion of shared values, norms and distinct foreign policy as the source of harmonious relations has the most support among democratic peace theorists (De Mesquita...

Checks and balances, as described by de Tocqueville, suggest that, among other things, partisan representatives, whose tenure is predicated on re-election (De Mesquita and Lalman 1988), will oppose war according to the will of the people. Ray describes the pervasive desire for leaders to stay in power from the realists’ point of view in a two-level game that requires balancing domestic and international security. This idea, “the assumption that a primary goal of leaders of states is to stay in power,” is seldom realistically evaluated in the democratic peace research (Ray 1999). Lake (1992) and Doyle (1986) weigh in on this side of the democratic peace debate. People, suggests Kant, will not be willing to pay the cost of war. Kant agrees, however, that while universal hospitality may affect alliances, the real influential characteristics are power and interests (Spiro 1994:81).

Mancur Olson (1982) proposes that the incentive to produce goods will be weak if the threat of force exists. Due to this fear, as well as a mutual dependency in the area of trade and commerce, O’Neal (1997), Ray (1998), Doyle (1986) and Russet (1993) include the liberal theory of free-market politics as predicting an imminent peaceful and democratic relationship between states. Such a concept is derived from the international theory called dependency, as elucidated by Lipset, in which “key historical events may account for either the persistence or failure of democracy” (Lipset 1981:28). Joanne Gowa’s quantitative research, however, weighs in on the opposite side of the coin. She concludes that norm based behavior is often too difficult to discern; and in spite of trying to fit the replicated previous findings, she could not validate the results, instead declaring that “democratic peace exists only during the Cold War” and that there is no evidence of democratic peace at any other time (Gowa 1999:3). Among others who voice opposition to democratic peace as empirical law are Dixon, Oren, Spiro and Layne. Spiro goes so far as to declare that Doyle’s perspective is controversial and suspect, allowing disagreement and falsification to coexist within his studies (1994:79). The absence of war between liberal democracies, suggests Spiro, are based on analysis that is sensitive to the selected definitions of terms like democracy and war and the chosen methods of statistical analysis (Spiro 1994:51).

Oren (1995) goes to great length to express that claims of democratic peace are not value-free. Most of the terminology is not normalized and amount to a description of similarities that are America-like. Layne denies a connection that makes democratic peace theory a more reliable receptor than realism “as a predictor of international outcomes”